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We outline a dividend signaling model that features investors who are averse to dividend
cuts. Managers with strong unobservable cash earnings pay high dividends but retain enough
to be likely not to fall short next period. The model is consistent with a Lintner partial-
adjustment model, modal dividend changes of zero, stronger market reactions to dividend
cuts than increases, comparatively infrequent and irregular repurchases, and a mechanism
that does not depend on public destruction of value, which managers reject in surveys. New
tests involve stronger reactions to changes from longer-maintained dividend levels and
reference point currencies of American Depository Receipt dividends. (JEL D82, G35)
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Managers share a number of common views about their dividend policies,
as shown in the survey by Brav et al. (2005). They strive to avoid reducing
dividends per share (of the 384 managers surveyed, 93.8% agreed); they try
to maintain a smooth dividend stream (89.6%); and they are reluctant to make
changes that might have to be reversed (77.9%). They follow such policies
because they believe that there are negative consequences to reducing dividends
(88.1%), which they believe convey information to investors (80%). While
caution is merited in interpreting survey responses, the Brav et al. (2005)
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results are further consistent with Lintner’s (1956) own survey and interviews,
his partial-adjustment model, and a large empirical literature demonstrating a
significant response to dividend announcements.
While managers view dividends as some sort of signal to investors, they
also cast doubt on the mechanisms of standard dividend signaling models. For
example, the proposition that dividends are used to show that their firm can
bear costs such as borrowing external funds or passing up investment was
summarily rejected (4.4% agreement, the lowest in the entire survey). The idea
of signaling through costly taxes did not receive much more support (16.6%).
Again, while we might not expect managers to admit public destruction of
value even in an anonymous survey, these findings suggest there is more to the
story than the economic mechanisms driving well-known signaling models
such as Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), John and Williams
(1985), Kumar (1988), Bernheim (1991), Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000),
and Guttman, Kadan, and Kandel (2010).
In this paper we use loss aversion, a feature of the prospect theory value
function of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), to motivate a behavioral signaling
model. A loss-averse value function has a kink at the reference point whereby
marginal utility is discontinuously higher in the domain of losses. Loss aversion
is supported by a considerable literature in psychology, finance, and economics,
as we briefly review later.
The essence of our stylized model is that investors evaluate current dividends
against a psychological reference point established by past dividends. Because
investors are particularly disappointed when dividends are cut, dividends
can credibly signal information about earnings. The model is inherently
multiperiod, which leads to more natural explanations for the survey results
above and other facts about dividend policy such as the Lintner partial-
adjustment model, which emerges in equilibrium, and which static signaling
models cannot address. While it is difficult to measure investor utility functions
per se outside the laboratory, we perform some novel tests that get at the core
intuitions of the approach.
To provide a bit more detail, the model uses reference point preferences as
the mechanism for costly signaling. The manager’s utility function reflects a
preference both for a high stock price today and for avoiding a dividend cut
in the future. In the first period, the manager inherits an exogenous reference
level dividend, and receives private information about earnings. The manager
balances the desire to signal current earnings by paying higher dividends with
the potential cost of not being able to meet or exceed a new and higher reference
point through the combination of savings from the first period and random
second-period earnings. In equilibrium, managers that cannot meet the inherited
dividend level pay out everything in the first period, as the marginal cost of
missing the reference point is high; managers with intermediate first-period
earnings pool to pay the reference dividend; and managers with strong first-
period earnings pay out a fraction that raises the reference level for the future
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but, given their savings and expected second-period earnings, to a level they
are relatively confident that they can maintain.
This simple model is consistent with several facts about dividend policy that
cannot be handled in static models. First, the modal dividend change is zero. In
a rational continuous setting, there is no special significance to paying the same
dividend as last period.1 Second, for reasonable parameter values, firms with
high or stable earnings engage in a partial-adjustment policy that resembles the
Lintner model. Third, firms are punished more for dividend cuts than they are for
symmetric raises, and so avoid raising the dividend to a level that will be difficult
to sustain. Fourth, the approach offers an explanation for why repurchases are
less frequent than dividends despite their tax advantage: unlike dividends per
share, the parameters of a hypothetical “regular” repurchase program cannot
be specified in salient and repeatable numbers. Fifth, the approach is intuitively
compatible with the widespread practice of paying dividends in round numbers.
Finally, the mechanism of the model is novel and not inconsistent with the
available survey evidence. Strong types do not publicly burn money with
certainty, but rather they implicitly burn expected utility by risking falling
short the next period; for reasonable parameter values, actual utility burning
by strong firms does not usually occur in equilibrium.
After confirming the result that investors respond asymmetrically to dividend
increases and cuts, we proceed to our main test. The general intuition of
signaling around a movable reference point suggests the comparative static
that the signaling power of dividends, in terms of market reactions to changes,
is stronger when reference point effects are stronger. While we do not model
memory and salience, we hypothesize that the repetition of a particular dividend
level tends to ingrain a reference point. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find
that the asymmetric response to dividend changes is more pronounced when
the new dividend breaks a multi-year streak of quarterly dividends per share.
We also conduct a brief placebo test involvingAmerican Depository Receipts
(ADRs). In this sample, there is no clustering and nothing special about the
market’s reaction around zero dividend changes in terms of U.S. dollars. Rather,
the reference point is denominated in foreign currency. Investors have settled
on a particular reference point currency even though the dividend’s economic
value to some of them, and perhaps the firm’s ability to pay that value, fluctuates
with the exchange rate.
Our approach complements other papers that connect dividends and
reference points or prospect theory. Shefrin and Statman (1984) argue that
dividends improve the utility of investors with prospect theory value functions
if they also mentally account (Thaler 1999) for dividends and capital gains
and losses separately. However, in their work, dividends serve no signaling
1 Guttman, Kadan, and Kandel (2010) show that an extension of the Miller-Rock model can generate sticky
dividends, but point out that such equilibria are just a subset of multiple pooling equilibria. In the reference point
approach, by contrast, the reason to focus on sticky dividend levels is straightforward.
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purpose, and the model generates no particular relationship to a Lintner policy.
Another recent contribution is Lambrecht and Myers (2012). In their model,
managers maximize the present value of the utility of rents that they extract
from profits. They smooth dividends and prefer a Lintner policy because they
have habit formation preferences and rents move with dividends given the
budget constraint. We discuss these and related papers. More generally, our
paper adds to the literature on behavioral corporate finance surveyed in Baker
and Wurgler (2012).
The first section reviews the relevant literature on reference-dependent utility.
The second section describes the model. The third discusses its compatibility
with known facts of dividend policy, as well as some extensions of those
facts. The fourth conducts a novel test and a placebo test. The fifth section
concludes.
1. Background: Reference-Dependence and Reference Points
In the time since Markowitz (1952) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
proposed theories of choice based on utility that depends not only on the level
of economic states, but on changes, the literatures on empirical choice behavior
and the psychological analysis of value have advanced considerably, as have
their applications to economics and finance. We first review this literature more
generally and then apply it to dividends.
1.1 Reference-dependent utility and loss aversion
We focus on two central features of the prospect theory value function: that
utility depends on changes in states relative to a reference point, and that
losses bring more pain than symmetric gains bring pleasure. Our applications
to dividends do not require a full review of prospect theory, which as a whole
is a theory of choice under uncertainty.
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) review the classic literature on loss aversion.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced loss aversion to reflect then-known
patterns in choice behavior. The subsequent literature suggests its relevance in
a wide range of applications. One implication of loss aversion is what Thaler
(1980) termed the endowment effect. Kahneman, Knetch, and Thaler (1990)
found that the value of an item increases when it is considered already in one’s
endowment. A literature has developed on differences between the willingness
to pay for a small improvement versus willingness to accept a small loss, another
reflection of loss aversion. (These literatures suggest the ballpark figure that
losses matter slightly more than twice as much as gains, a figure that we employ
in our numerical example.) Finally, a related phenomenon is status quo bias.
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) documented a preference for the status quo
even when costs of change are small relative to potential benefits, such as in
choices about medical plans.
700
Dividends as Reference Points: A Behavioral Signaling Approach
1.2 Reference points
Several aspects of reference points in the context of dividend policy deserve
discussion. If “gains” and “losses” matter, how are they defined? In other
words, what is the reference point and how is it formed? Can it change? What
determines its strength? Can there be multiple reference points? The literature
on loss aversion does not provide general answers to these questions. The
relevant reference point depends on the setting. In static choice situations,
it is often obvious. For example, in the applications and experiments above,
the reference point is the decision maker’s current position. But in many
circumstances, “current position” is not always so well defined. In Abel
(1990), for example, the reference point for utility includes others’ current
consumption levels.
A more complicated situation arises when the decision maker has some
control over the framing of an outcome. Thaler (1999) reviews the concept
of mental accounting, in which the decision maker may, for example, choose to
define reference points and segregate outcomes so as to strategically maximize
his happiness under a value function defined over gains and losses.
Shefrin and Statman (1984) apply these ideas to explain why investors like
dividends, although their perspective is very different than ours. Shefrin and
Statman argue that investors prefer to mentally divide returns into capital
gains and dividends and consider each separately. Their explanation employs
a third feature of the prospect theory value function—its concavity in gains
and convexity in losses. Dividends allow investors to flexibly repackage what
would otherwise be a large capital loss into a slightly larger capital loss and a
dividend. If the capital loss is large, then a slightly larger loss causes little extra
pain, while the dividend can be accounted for as a gain relative to a reference
point of no dividend and thus a return to the value function where marginal
utility is high. Likewise, if there is a large positive return, making the capital
gain slightly smaller does not decrease utility much, while the ability to treat
the dividend as a separate gain allows for an additional, disproportionate utility
increase.
Reference points can also differ in their temporal character. In dynamic
situations with uncertainty, the reference point is even harder to generalize
about. It may involve the future, not just the present. In Koszegi and Rabin
(2006, 2009), agents are loss averse over changes in beliefs about future
outcomes such as consumption. Here, expectations about the future make up
the reference point. For example, utility might depend in part on the prospect
of a raise.
Past circumstances can also supply powerful reference points. Genesove and
Mayer (2001) find that people resist selling their homes below the purchase
price. Shefrin and Statman (1985) find that the purchase price of a security
serves as a reference point. Odean (1998) confirms this, and also suggests, like
Arkes, Hirshleifer, Jiang, and Lim (2008), that such reference points can change
over time, albeit sluggishly. Baker and Xuan (2015) argue that the stock price
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that a new CEO inherits is an important reference point for raising new equity.
The idea of one’s prior consumption as a reference point for the utility of current
consumption is represented through internal habit formation preferences as in
Constantinides (1990).
In settings where the past supplies the reference point, its power may depend
on the strength of the associated memory. Most of the literature does not
incorporate the role of memory, however. A probability distribution is not
memorable, and a rational expectation about the future is going to be continuous
and somewhat indeterminate. The particulars of past consumption levels may
not be memorable. In general, factors that increase the strength of a memory
include repetition and rehearsal (Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968), elaboration
(Palmere et al. 1983), distinctiveness (Eysenck and Eysenck 1980), salience,
associated effort (Tyler et al. 1979), or emotional association. For individual
numbers, ease of recall matters. Phone companies sell phone numbers that
include round numbers or repeated digits at a premium.
A stock’s 52-week high provides an interesting example of a memorable
number that for some purposes forms a reference point. The shareholder may
have a positive association with that level. It is a specific and salient number.
It can be constant (repeated and rehearsed) for up to 52 weeks, but also varies
over time. Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) find that employee exercise of
stock options doubles when the stock price tops its 52-week high. Recent peak
prices are important for the pricing and deal success of mergers and acquisitions
(Baker, Pan, and Wurgler 2012).
1.3 Past dividends as reference points
This discussion shows that theory alone cannot identify “the” reference point.
In this paper we hypothesize that in the context of dividend policy, past
dividends are reference points against which current dividends are judged. Our
hypothesis touches on many of the concepts discussed above. The reference
point we hypothesize is based on past experience, as in the disposition effect of
Shefrin and Statman (1985). It is also dynamic, as in internal habit formation.
Fluctuations in the dividend upset expectations about future dividends. Baker,
Nagel, and Wurgler (2007) find that many investors consume the full amount
of their dividends, drawing attention further to their level.
Dividends are also packaged to be memorable. They are formally and
explicitly announced at discrete and regular intervals, which encourages the
formation of memory. The same level is often repeated for many quarters in
a row, further encouraging memory. Anecdotally, they tend to be announced
with special fanfare and management commentary upon initiation or increases.
Conversely, dividend decreases are downplayed, accompanied by excuses or
explanations that frame the action as repositioning for growth. Dividend cuts
are disproportionately announced on Fridays and often after the market close
(Damodaran 1989). As we shall see, dividends cluster at round numbers, and
changes are commonly in round-number intervals or designed to meet or exceed
702
Dividends as Reference Points: A Behavioral Signaling Approach
a round-number threshold. The memorability of prior dividends is central to our
theory—it increases their power as reference points and, consequently, current
dividends as signals.
2. A Model of Signaling with Dividends as Reference Points
We present a stylized dividend signaling model with reference dependence. The
model uses nonstandard investor preferences, not public destruction of firm
value through investment distortions or taxes, to provide the costly signaling
mechanism.
There are two key ingredients. First, a reference point appears in a
representative investor’s objective function. There is a kink in utility, so that a
drop in dividends just below the reference point is discontinuously more painful
than a small increase in dividends is pleasurable. Second, in common with all
signaling models, the manager cares about the current estimate of firm value
as well as the long-term welfare of shareholders.
Reference points shape dividend policy in several ways. On one hand, to the
extent that today’s dividend is the reference point against which future dividend
payments will be judged, the manager would like to restrain current dividends,
saving some resources for the next period to make up for a possible shortfall
in future income. On the other hand, setting aside effects on future shareholder
welfare, the manager would like to pay a dividend today that exceeds the current
reference point. Moreover, because the manager also cares about the
current estimate of firm value, he might also increase dividends beyond the
current reference point to signal private information about the firm’s ability
to pay. This sort of signaling mechanism works because firms with limited
resources are unwilling to incur the expected future costs of missing an
endogenous reference point.
2.1 Setup
The model has two periods: t =1 and 2. There are two players: a manager and an
investor with reference-dependent preferences. In the first period, the investor
arrives with an exogenous reference point for dividends d0. In some ways, this
is a single snapshot in a multiperiod model. While the inherited reference point
could in principle be endogenized, we believe the technical costs would be
large compared with the benefits in extra realism or intuition. The manager
also receives private information about cash earnings ε1 and pays a dividend
d1 in the first period. This dividend forms a new reference point for the second,
liquidating dividend d2. Today’s dividend d1 relative to d0 tells the investor
something about the manager’s private information and hence the value of the
firm. In the second period, the manager simply pays d2.
2.1.1 Manager utility. The manager cares about what the investor thinks
about ε1 today. He also cares about the investor’s long-run utility. This objective
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function is in the spirit of standard signaling models like Leland and Pyle (1977),
Miller and Rock (1985), or Stein (1989), which use weighted averages of the
dividend-adjusted stock market price and the investor’s long-run utility. Our
simplified objective function is:
V ≡Em [λEi [ε1]+(1−λ)u(d1,d2|d0)], (1)
where d1 and d2 are the period-specific dividends of the firm, u is the investor’s
utility function, given an exogenous initial reference point of d0, and Em and Ei
are the expectations operators for the manager and the investor, respectively.2
2.1.2 Investor utility. The interesting aspect of this signaling model is that
the investor has a kink in his preferences for dividends d1 and d2. The first
kink is around an exogenous reference point for first-period dividends d0, and
the second kink is around an endogenous reference point for second-period
dividends:
u(d1,d2|d0)=d1 +b(d1 −d0)1d1<d0 +βd2 +βb(d2 −d1)1d2<d1 . (2)
Put simply, the investor cares about fundamental value, or total dividend
payments, but with a twist. The level of the reference point comes from
historical firm dividend policy, and b is greater than zero so that the marginal
utility of dividends falls discontinuously at the reference point; the pain of
coming up short is high. This utility function reflects loss aversion with a kink
at a reference point. We leave out the complexity of curvature.3 β1 is a
discount rate. The second-period reference point equals first-period dividends
d1 by assumption. In reality, the reference point and the intensity of the reference
point b may be determined by a long history of levels and changes in dividend
policy. The fact that each dividend payment forms a separate reference point
also requires a practice of narrow framing. This is not a reference point applied
to total ending wealth, but rather a reference point applied much more narrowly
both across stocks and time, in the spirit of Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006).
2 As in the standard signaling models, we do not microfound λ. The usual argument for this general class of utility
functions is that the adjusted stock price, separate from fundamentals, has a direct impact on the manager’s
welfare through compensation or corporate control or an indirect impact through the interests of short-term
investors. Also, rather than compute a stock price, we put the investor’s expectation of ε1 directly into the
manager’s objective. This is an innocuous assumption, because in equilibrium the stock price will be a linear
transformation of the expectation of ε1.
Note that there is no investment decision, so the firm is a simple payout machine. This is entirely for tractability
and to focus on the reference-dependent preferences of investors. If investment were not observable, it could
in principle be another dimension of the signaling problem as in Bebchuk and Stole (1993). If investment is
observable with a convex cost of suboptimal investment, it can interfere with the specific form of the equilibrium.
We conjecture that no firm would miss the reference point by a small margin. In the event that dividends fall
below the reference point, there would be a gap, where dividends would fall below current profits by an amount
that accommodated at least some investment.
3 We conjecture that adding convexity in the domain of losses in the utility function helps to explain why firms
that cut dividends tend to do so by a larger amount. That realistic and empirically relevant element of investor
preferences is left out of the theoretical development.
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It is worth noting at this point that many of the features of the equilibrium
described below do not require both a β>1 and a λ<0. Either one will suffice
to generate a managerial incentive to pay dividends sooner rather than later.
The important trade-off is between maximizing current dividends and avoiding
future cuts. Either parameter restriction is sufficient to generate the incentive
to maximize current dividends.
2.1.3 Budget constraint. There is no new equity or debt available to finance
the payment of dividends and no excess cash balances available in the first
period. The most the manager can pay in the first period is ε1, and the most he
can pay in the second period is ε2 plus any savings from the previous period.
This leads to the following constraints:
0d1ε1 and d2 =ε1 +ε2 −d1. (3)
These follow from the assumptions of no new financing and a manager that
pays out all earnings.
2.1.4 Information. In the absence of a signaling motive, the first-best would
have the manager saving any resources above the first-period reference point,
both to lower the reference point created for the second period and to save
resources to meet this lower reference point in the event of low second-period
earnings. We now introduce the signaling problem. For simplicity, the manager
has no control over the cash earnings of the firm. Note that this is a bit different
from a traditional signaling model where the manager must destroy firm value
to impress the capital markets.4 There is also no agency problem of the sort
examined in Lambrecht and Myers (2012), where the manager can keep cash
for himself. This setup is, at least in spirit, more consistent with what managers
say in surveys about their dividend policy.
The fundamental value of the firm appears in two installments,
ε1 +ε2. (4)
Think of these as cash earnings that are not observable to the investor. This is
obviously an extreme assumption of asymmetric information. It is worth noting
the key elements of the assumption, which might each seem more reasonable.
First, the manager must have some informational advantage over the investor in
learning ε1. Otherwise, there is no signaling problem. Second, the payment of
the observable dividend must form the investor’s reference point, not the firm’s
reported financials, such as earnings per share or cash balances. Otherwise,
the manager has no lever to signal his information about ε1. For simplicity,
4 In any model that requires costly external finance as a production input, dividends destroy value through the
budget constraint. We wish to distinguish standard signaling models where this is the driving mechanism, as
opposed to a generic side effect.
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we assume that the second-period cash earnings have a uniform distribution,
ε2 ∼U [0,2].
We have considered extensions of the model where the source of the
information asymmetry is over ε2, a quantity that would not appear explicitly
in any financial statements. This assumption produces similar results, although
the effects of the budget constraint described in the next paragraph can change.
The simpler model that we examine here has a mechanical link between type
in terms of firm quality and current resources. Another positive feature of this
setup is that it builds nicely on the empirical evidence of Benartzi, Michaely,
and Thaler (1997) and Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002), who show
that dividends are not useful signals of future earnings growth.
2.1.5 Beliefs. The investors’ beliefs are determined in equilibrium by a
rational expectations condition. This can in some cases induce unreasonable
equilibria. For instance, suppose that investors believe ε1 equals the mean of
the prior distribution if d1 =0, and believe that ε1 =−10100 otherwise. In this
situation, managers will set d1 =0 regardless of ε1. Because d1 =0 is never
observed in equilibrium, the investors’ beliefs satisfy a rational expectations
equilibrium. To rule out these perverse equilibria, we restrict attention to
Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibria. The relevant restriction on beliefs is
that the expectation of ε1 is greater than or equal to the manager’s choice of d1,
which follows directly from the budget constraint. Without loss of generality,
we make a further and intuitive restriction on the investor’s out-of-equilibrium
beliefs. If there is a level of dividends d1 equal to d that is not observed
in equilibrium, then we can modify this equilibrium so that the investor’s
conditional expectation of ε1 is simply equal to d . Because no manager pays d
in equilibrium, this does not cause any deviations.
2.2 Solving the Model
An equilibrium is characterized by the manager’s choice of d1 and the investor’s
beliefs over ε1 conditional on d1. The manager takes these beliefs as given when
solving his maximization problem. To simplify notation, we define F (d1, d0)
as the investor’s expectation of ε1 when the manager pays d1. Substituting the
investor’s utility function from Equation (2) into the manager’s objective in
Equation (1), applying the law of iterated expectations, using the assumption
of a uniform distribution for ε2, and simplifying leads to:
V ≡λF (d1,d0)+(1−λ)
(
1+ε1 +(1−β)d1 +b(d1 −d0)1d1<d0
−bβ (d1 − ε12 )21d1>ε12
)
. (5)
The first term is weighted by λ and measures the impact of the dividend
decision on the investor’s expectation over current profits, and the second term
is weighted by (1−λ) and measures the impact of the dividend decision on the
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investor’s long-run utility. We relabel this second term as V0(d1, d0). Note that
V0 is differentiable in d1 everywhere except at d0 and ε12 . The first derivative
of V0 breaks down into four regions as follows:
V ′0 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1−β+b
1−β+b−2βb(d1 − ε12 )
1−β
1−β−2βb(d1 − ε12 )
where
d1 <d0,
ε1
2
ε1
2 <d1 <d0
d0 <d1 <
ε1
2
d0,
ε1
2 <d1
(6)
It is also useful to note that V0 is supermodular. That is, marginal utility is
weakly increasing in ε1, or ∂
2V0
∂d1∂ε1
0.
2.2.1 Characterizing equilibria. We define an equilibrium as a mapping
from manager types ε1 to dividend d1, or d1(ε1). If there exists a level of
dividends such that d(ε1)=d for all x1ε1x2 and x1 =x2, call d a pool.
2.2.2 Out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We also assume without loss of generality
that any out-of-equilibrium beliefs are simply F (d1, d0)=d1. To show that this is
without loss of generality, suppose that there exists some value d1 =d such that
d is not paid by any type of manager in equilibrium. Consider a modification
of this equilibrium in which the investor’s conditional beliefs F (d,d0) are
(weakly) lowered to d . This makes paying d (weakly) less attractive to any
type of manager. Because no manager pays d in equilibrium, this does not
induce any deviations, and this new set of beliefs is also an equilibrium.
This is enough to narrow down the possible equilibria somewhat. Using the
fact that a manager’s marginal utility of dividends is increasing in first-period
profits ε1, we can show that any equilibrium must feature dividends that rise
with first-period profits ε1, provided that there is at least some discounting. The
proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Dividends are weakly monotonic in profits. The equilibrium
level of dividends d1 =d1(ε1) is a non-decreasing function of ε1.
We make a simplifying assumption, restricting the range of model
parameters. With this restriction, we guarantee that marginal utility in Equation
(6) is only negative when d1 is high relative to both d0 and ε12 . This will be true
as long as d0 is not too large and b is not too small. Intuitively, this assumption
means that the effect of the reference point is not trivial, and it serves two
purposes. It guarantees that the marginal utility shown in the ε12 <d1 <d1 portion
of Equation (6) is positive when d1 is less than d0. Second, it ensures that the
signaling game does not break down for high-profit managers. If the cost of
signaling is too low, there is no effective way to separate high-profit from
lower-profit managers.
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Assumption 1. d0 is not too large and b is not too small. The exogenous
parameters of the model must satisfy d0 1−β+bβb .
2.2.3 Separating behavior. The first step is to derive the two regions of
separating behavior. Because the level of dividends paid as a function of profits
d1(ε1) is weakly monotonic given Proposition 1, it must also be differentiable
almost everywhere. So, focusing for the moment on areas where the dividend
function is differentiable, we can write the derivative of the investor belief
function F ′(d1,d0) with respect to d1 as F ′(d1,d0)=d ′1(ε1)−1. Differentiating
the manager’s objective in Equation (7) with respect to dividends paid d1 leads
to two possibilities. The first is that the manager is constrained at a corner
solution by the budget constraint, so that d1(ε1) simply equals ε1, and the
second is that the following interior first-order condition holds:
0=λF ′ (d1,d0)+(1−λ)
(
(1−β)+b1d1<d0 −2bβ
(
d1 − ε12
)
1
d1>
ε1
2
)
, (7)
Rearranging terms and substituting for F ′ gives the following differential
equation:
2bβ
(
d1 (ε1)− ε12
)
1
d1>
ε1
2
=
λ
1−λ
1
d ′1 (ε1)
+(1−β)+b1d1<d0 . (8)
So, any separating points in the equilibrium must either have dividends binding
at the budget constraint or Equation (7) must hold at d1(ε1)> ε12 . Lemmas 1
and 2 define the two regions of separation.
Lemma 1. Separating behavior below d0 takes the form d1(ε1)=ε1. Formally,
suppose that d1(ε1) is strictly monotonic in the neighborhood of x with d1(ε1)>
d0, then d1(ε1)=ε1.
This follows from Assumption 1, which guarantees that the marginal utility
in Equation (6) is positive everywhere in the range where d1 <d0.
Lemma 2. Separating behavior above d0 can take the form d1(ε1)= ε12 +α.
This follows directly from differential Equation (8), evaluated in the range
where d1 >d0. A solution to this equation is:
d1 (ε1)= ε12 +
1
bβ
(
λ
1−λ +
1−β
2
)
. (9)
In other words, managers pay out a fixed fraction of profits plus a constant to
differentiate themselves, at a cost in terms of establishing a higher reference
point that might not be met.
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2.2.4 Pooling behavior. In general, there will be a pool in equilibrium. If
there were no pool, then by definition, there would be separating behavior
everywhere. Proposition 1 and separating behavior everywhere imply that
dividends are strictly monotonic. Lemma 1 says that separating behavior
below takes the form d1(ε1)=ε1 when d1 <0. Strict monotonicity means that
d1(d0)=d0. Strict monotonicity, the budget constraint in Equation (3), and
Lemma 2 mean that the right-hand side of Equation (9) must equal d0 when
evaluated at ε1 =d0. This pins down a knife-edge set of parameter values where
there is no pool in equilibrium. In particular, we must have d0 precisely equal
to 2
bβ
(
λ
1−λ +
1−β
2
)
. In all other cases, there will be a pool in equilibrium.
Proposition 2. There is a pool in equilibrium unless d0 = 2bβ
(
λ
1−λ +
1−β
2
)
.
2.3 Characterizing the Equilibrium
Now, armed with the knowledge that there is generally a pool in equilibrium,
we can attempt to characterize a reasonable set of pooling equilibria. It is worth
noting that this is not a unique equilibrium. It is possible to have multiple pools
and pools at levels other than d0. However, a particularly natural equilibrium,
given the salience of the reference point, involves three ranges of dividend
policies. There is a high payout ratio of 100% or d1(ε1)=ε1 for firms with
the extra motivation to clear the initial reference point of d0. Next, managers
cluster at d0 once this motivation drops out of Equation (6). Finally, there is a
lower payout ratio characterized by Equation (9) for firms well above the initial
reference point, who nonetheless pay higher dividends than the reference point
to separate themselves from each other and from the pool at d0. The form
of the partial pooling equilibrium is not dissimilar to that in Guttman et al.
(2010), though the nature of the signaling mechanism is quite different, and
perhaps more importantly, in our approach it is clear why dividends pool at the
prior period’s level as opposed to some arbitrary level. We describe a specific
equilibrium in more mathematical detail using Propositions 1 and 2 and a
solution in Equation (9).
Proposition 3. There exists an equilibrium dividend policy in which
d1 = ε1 for ε1 < d0
d1 = d0 for d0 < ε1 < x1
d1 =
1
2ε1 +
1
bβ
(
λ
(1−λ) +
(1−β)
2
)
≡ 12ε1 + α for ε1 > x1
with associated equilibrium beliefs of:
Ei[ε1 | d1] = d1 for d1 < d0
Ei[ε1 | d1] = 12 (d0 +x1) for d1 = d0
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Ei[ε1 | d1] = d1 for d0 < d1 < x1.
Ei[ε1 | d1] =2(d1 −α) for d1 d0.
Where x1 solves a quadratic or a linear equation depending on the size of the
pool:
bβ
(
d0 − x12
)2
+
(
1−β+ λ1−λ
)
x1
2 −
(
(1−β)(d0 −α)+bβα2 + λ1−λ d02
)
=0
when x1 <2d0, or x1 =
λ
1−λd0 +2(1−β)(d0 −α)+2bβα2
λ
1−λ +(1−β)
when x12d0.
The derivation of is x1 in Appendix A. Incentive compatibility here requires
a manager with ε1 <d0 to be willing to pay d1 =ε1. More importantly, a
manager with ε1 =x1 must be indifferent between paying d0 and paying
1
2x1 +
1
bβ
(
λ
(1−λ) +
(1−β)
2
)
, which we define as 12x1 +α to simplify notation and
show that in this range the manager is paying a fixed amount α above the
dividend level that would sustain second-period dividends at the new reference
point with no risk. For this to hold, the signaling benefit of shifting the investor’s
expectations from 12 (d0 +x1) to x1 must equal the cost differential of evaluating
Equation (7) at d0 and at 12x1 +α. This leads to the simple quadratic or linear
equation in the proposition. The specific formula for the top of the pool is
relatively uninformative, except below we will argue that in general the size
of the pool, meaning the size of x1, will be increasing in the strength of the
reference point b, provided that the parameters allow for an equilibrium of this
type.
For example, suppose the manager cares equally about stock price and
utility—that is, λ=0.5. If d0 is 1, b is 2.5, and β is 1, then Proposition 3
indicates that the equilibrium cutoff x1 is 1.6. For ε1 above 1.6, the first-period
dividend is 12ε1 +0.4. This exactly trades off the marginal signaling benefit
per unit of dividends of 2.0, using investor beliefs implicit in Proposition 1,
against the second-period marginal cost—that is, the first derivative of Equation
(7), of 5×(d1 − 12ε1)=5×(0.4)=2.0. For ε1 between 1.0 and 1.6, the first-
period dividend is simply d0, or 1.0. At ε1 equal to 1.6, where there should be
indifference, the signaling benefit of separating from this pool is 1.6 minus
the average of x1 =1.6 and d0 =1.0, or 0.3. The cost from Equation (7) is
2.5×(0.42 −0.22)=0.3. This cost is decreasing in ε1, so there is no incentive
for any of the managers clustered at d1 =1.0 to raise the first-period dividend.
For ε1 below 1.0, the first-period dividend is ε1. Here, the manager is limited
by the budget constraint. The marginal first-period benefit per unit of dividends
of 2.5 plus the marginal signaling benefit per unit of dividends of 1.0, using
investor beliefs implicit in Proposition 1, totals 3.5. This exceeds the second-
period marginal cost just below d0 of 5×(1−0.5)=2.5. So, dividends are at a
corner solution of d1 =ε1 from Equation (3).
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The intuition is straightforward. There is a powerful incentive to try to reach
the existing reference point of d0 both to satisfy the kinked investor utility
and to raise investor beliefs discontinuously from d0 to 12 (d0 +x1). There is a
steep rise in dividends per unit of cash earnings, or a 100% payout ratio, below
the reference point. Then, there is clustering at d0. Even firms that could pay
somewhat more choose not to, because of the costs of setting a high reference
point for the second period. Eventually, there is a jump in dividends once cash
earnings become sufficiently high. At that point, though, dividend policy is
still fairly conservative, with managers saving a large fraction of dividends in
reserve for the second period. In other words, there is a more gradual rise in
dividends per unit of cash earnings. See Panel A of Figure 1.
Another way to see this is by plotting the histogram of dividend changes
in Panels B and C of Figure 1. It simplifies graphical illustration to assume
that first-period cash earnings ε1 are normally distributed, with a mean of
1
2 (d0 +x1).5 There is a spike in the distribution at the reference point in Panel
B. Moreover, even when we remove this spike in Panel C, there is still a jump
in the distribution moving from the range just to the left of the reference point
to the range just to the right. The distribution of dividend changes otherwise
has a lower and longer tail of larger dividend cuts to the left of the reference
point.
Finally, we plot the “market reaction” to dividend announcements in Panel
D of Figure 1. This is measured as the percentage change in expected utility
in Equation (2) from before the announcement. Note that because utility takes
a linear form, it can be thought of as a stock price, or the amount of cash the
investor would give up prior to the dividend payment, in order to hold the firm’s
shares. An equivalent picture would emerge by simply plotting the change in
the rational expectation of realized profits ε1 because this is the source of the
change in expected utility. The interesting behavior is in the narrow range
around the reference point. The drop in utility per unit of dividends is steeper
to the left of the reference point than to the right. Missing the reference point
by just a tiny amount leads to a drop of 12 (x1 −d0) in the investor’s expectation.
But it takes a discontinuous increase in dividends of 12x1 +α−d0 to achieve the
equivalent increase in expectations. As a result, there is a kink in the reaction
at exactly d0.6
Next, we turn to comparative statics. In particular, we are interested in how
these patterns change with a change in the cost b of falling below the reference
point.
5 Also, a sum of uniform variables converges quickly to a normal distribution, so if one conceives ε1 as such a
sum, then the relationship to the uniform distribution of ε2 in the model is not entirely unnatural.
6 It is important to note that this asymmetry is only in the neighborhood of zero. The slopes of changes in expected
utility take a different pattern for differences that are away from zero. In the range of dividend cuts, the slope is
in expected profits and utility is flatter, when compared with the slope in the range of dividend increases.
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Proposition 4. In the equilibrium described in Proposition 3, x1 and the
market reaction to d1 <d0 are increasing in b.
The proof for the linear case is inAppendixA. Put another way, Proposition 4
says that there is more clustering of dividends at the reference point d0 as the
intensity of reference point preferences increases. As a result, the market reacts
more negatively to a narrow miss. More information is revealed.
Again, we show this by example in Figure 2. The comparison is between
b equal to 2.1 and b equal to 2.3. The exact b is not important. A similar
equilibrium can be sustained at higher d0 and lower b; these parameters make
for clear pictures (as b=2.5 in the proof yields round numbers). As we have
no prior on the level of the reference point, this confirms that the assumptions
required to support equilibrium here are not unreasonable ones. In each case,
we re-center the ex-ante distribution of ε1 at a mean of 12 (d0 +x1) and repeat
the plots from Figure 1. Note the effects of a higher b and hence x1. There is
more clustering and a larger spike in the distribution of dividend changes at d0.
The market reaction is more negative when dividends fall just short, and the
reaction is flatter above it, so that the kink at zero is more pronounced.
2.4 Reference-dependent behavior
Similar results are obtained if we replace reference-dependent preferences
with reference-dependent behavior. For example, we have analyzed a setup in
which investors sell their shares to risk-averse arbitrageurs with a probability
that rises as the dividend falls below a reference point. The possibility of a
dividend-induced dislocation in share price creates the same three incentives
for the manager: to restrain dividends to lower the hurdle for the future, to
clear today’s reference point and avoid the associated share price hit, and to
increase dividends and tomorrow’s reference point to signal firm quality. Such
a model delivers additional predictions about volume, which we test below.
Otherwise, however, it adds complexity and is somewhat further removed from
the psychology of reference dependence. In practice, both types of reference
dependence may exist.
3. The Model and Existing Evidence
We consider a number of stylized facts here in light of the model. We argue
that it captures most of these facts at least as well as existing signaling
approaches, such as Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), John and
Williams (1985), Kumar (1988), Bernheim (1991), and Allen, Bernardo, and
Welch (2000). To keep the discussion finite we will not make comparisons to
models based on agency problems, catering motives, clientele effects, or other
non-signaling mechanisms.
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3.1 Surveys
Dividend policy is an explicit choice of executives and the board. Although
survey results should always be treated cautiously, the concern that managers’
behavior may be guided not by their own hands but by an unseen higher market
force that they cannot articulate is harder to justify here. Thus, we view the fact
that our model is consistent with what managers say about dividend policy, or
at least not directly inconsistent with it, as an important success.
The strongest survey results fit well with our setup. For example, as noted
in the Introduction, the Brav et al. (2005) survey of 384 executives revealed
strong agreement that shareholders will react negatively to cuts in the dividend,
whereas the reward for increases is modest. Executives believe that dividends
convey information. As a result, they strive to keep a stable dividend policy.
These are straightforward predictions of the model. It is intrinsically dynamic,
and the stability of dividends is a central feature. Once a reference point is
established, even weak firms will strive to minimize the difference between it
and current dividends.
While standard signaling theories also predict that lower dividends are
associated with lower market values, executives reject them as based on
unrealistic foundations.As noted in the Introduction, executives say that they do
not use dividends to show that their firm can withstand the costs and scrutiny
associated with raising external capital, or to show that their firm can pass
up good projects and still perform well. Only a small minority of executives
endorsed signaling through taxes; Brav et al. (2005, 521) summarize taxes as
of “second-order importance.”
Brav et al. (2005) followed up their survey with in-depth interviews of 23
executives. They noted that “not a single interviewed executive told us that
his or her firm had ever thought of increasing payout as a costly means of
separating itself from competitors” (522–23). Our model does not explicitly
rely on public destruction of value to create a credible signal, so in that sense
it would not conflict with this aspect of the evidence.
Finally, standard signaling theories do not naturally focus on dividends per
share. It is natural to do so in the reference point context. Standard theories also
predict a continuous market reaction. There is nothing special about stability or
the historical level of payouts, such that falling short of this level would produce
a discontinuous reaction. Dividend policy is defined in more “economic” terms
in standard models, such as dividend yield or payout ratio, which are less salient
to investors. Dividend policy measured in these units would not make natural
reference points, explaining why stability of dividends per share is the usual
target.
3.2 The Lintner model
Miller (1986) suggested that the Lintner (1956) model was a behavioral
model, as opposed to originating from a traditional maximization problem.
Given reasonable parameter values, our model does have dividends
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following a partial-adjustment policy, and smoothed relative to earnings
(Fama and Babiak 1968).
In particular, the Lintner model takes last period’s dividend as the reference
level against which current dividends are determined. In our model, firms
confident of their ability to sustain high dividends pay out slightly above
half of current earnings (exactly half in the case of extreme reference point
preferences). They adopt this payout ratio because they do not want to set a
reference level that may be too high for themselves next period, but do wish to
separate themselves from a pool of firms with intermediate prospects that keep
dividends extremely smooth (indeed, constant). On average, then, dividends
are increasing in earnings but less than one-for-one, and firms are focused on
changes relative to the reference level set by lagged dividends. All of this adds
up to Lintner-like empirical predictions.
The models of Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), and John and
Williams (1985) are static and focus on levels, not changes. The model of
Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) is also presented in terms of levels, though
they outline a possible multiperiod extension that would be compatible with
smoothing. The model of Kumar (1988) leads to smoothing to the extent that
firm productivity does not vary much over time.
The cross-section of smoothing behavior is also reasonably consistent with
our model. Michaely and Roberts (2012) study dividend policy in public
versus private firms. The presumption is that private firms are less subject
to asymmetric information problems. Thus, there is less expectation that their
dividend policy would adhere to the predictions of our signaling model. In
particular, Michaely and Roberts find that private firms engage in much less
smoothing. In our framework, the interpretation would be that private firms
have less need for precautionary savings to be sure to meet the prior period’s
dividend. If they pay a lower dividend, little is revealed to insiders. Leary and
Michaely (2011) find another robust pattern in the cross-section, that high-
earnings firms are more likely to smooth dividends. This is exactly what the
medium and high “types” in our stylized model will do.
3.3 Repurchases vs. dividends
As Grullon and Michaely (2002) point out, some popular signaling models,
including Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), and the further
investigation of Miller and Rock by Guttman, Kadan, and Kandel (2010), imply
that dividends and repurchases are perfect substitutes. An enduring puzzle is
why repurchases are considerably less regular.
The reference point approach suggests a reason why dividends are better
signals: there is only one number to remember. There are, in contrast, at least
two parameters of a repurchase program: the purchase price, or price range for
a Dutch auction, and the number of shares sought. Of these, only the price is
likely to be salient, and clearly a firm cannot commit to repurchasing shares at
the same constant price quarter after quarter. Moreover, each investor receives
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Figure 3
Quarterly dividends per share
Histogram of announced dividends per share. The sample includes all records from the CRSP event file with a
distribution code (DISTCD) of 1232 (ordinary taxable cash dividends, paid quarterly) with a share code (SHRCD)
of 10 or 11 (ordinary common shares, excluding companies incorporated outside the United States, Americus
Trust Components, closed-end funds, and REITs) and non-missing data on the amount of the dividend and the
declaration date.
a dividend, but need not engage in a repurchase; only those selling need to pay
any attention at all. In short, repurchase programs are hard to specify in salient
and memorable terms, even when they are financially equivalent to dividends.
3.4 Salience and round numbers
In the remainder of this section we confirm some additional patterns in U.S.
dividends and extend them in directions suggested by our theoretical setup. See
Appendix B for a detailed description of our data and variable construction.
A core idea of the model is that the signaling power of dividends is
proportional to their use as reference points against which future dividends are
judged. We do not model memory, but it is inherent in the concept of a reference
point. Firms that signal in our model do not want to hide their dividend;
they want to make it salient or memorable. The psychological evidence and
introspection indicates that round numbers are easier to remember. In contrast,
one-period signaling theories are silent on this because investors need not
remember anything.
Consistent with the notion of salient reference points, dividends are indeed
paid in round numbers. Aerts, Van Campenhout, and Van Canegham (2008)
use Benford’s law to show that “0” is an unusually common second digit, but
a histogram makes the use of round numbers obvious. Figure 3 shows that
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the most common dividend per share is a quarter, followed by a dime, fifteen
cents, a nickel, and twenty cents. There are notable spikes at multiples of five
cents. Non-round values are rare. Apparently, many boards think of setting and
communicating dividend policy in an easily recalled dollar amount, rather than
the more “economic” alternative of setting a specific total payout to then divide
equally among shareholders. (We make some use of this fact in our empirical
specifications below.)
A related pattern is the tendency for increases to reach a round number
threshold—the next round number in dividends per share—presumably
contributing to the salience of the new level. For example, the next $0.10
threshold for a firm paying $0.11 is $0.20, the next $0.05 threshold is $0.15,
and the next $0.025 threshold is $0.125. In unreported results, we find that
the modal increase is exactly to the next threshold. For example, for the firm
that is currently paying $0.11, we find that paying $0.20 is much more likely
than paying $0.19 or $0.21. The same pattern occurs for $0.05 and $0.025
thresholds. These results might also be loosely interpreted in terms of the gap
in the distribution in Panel B of Figure 1. To be appreciated for raising the
dividend, firms must do so in more than a trivial way. (We note that the gap
in the distribution in Panel B of Figure 1 can be made arbitrarily small with
appropriate parameter values, and thus be made to look just like the increases
plotted in Figure 4.)
3.5 Clustering at zero changes
The pooling behavior in the model is consistent with the great reluctance to
change dividends. Figure 4 shows dividend changes when no split occurs
between dividend payments. As in Panels A and B of Figure 1, and further
summarized in Table 1, there is a very large mass at exactly zero, as also noted
by Guttman, Kadan, and Kandel (2010).
The exact mass at zero changes depends on the assumption about how often
firms actually review their dividend policy. We assume a quarterly cycle to be
consistent with prior work and because every firm in our sample could change
the dividend at any quarter. In practice, however, many firms revisit their payout
policy annually. The clustering at zero depicted in the histogram thus overstates
the true frequency of actual zero-change decisions.
Complicating matters further, a case study in the subsequent section shows
how a firm can change its frequency not just of active review but also of
actual payment. Unfortunately, one cannot know the policy for any given
firm, let alone all firms in CRSP. Our “streaks” analysis in the next section
demonstrates that both quarterly and annual reviews are used in practice. As we
discuss there, our quarterly assumption—while leading to some overstatement
of clustering at zero changes in the histogram—also leads to a bias “against”
the new tests.
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Table 1
Summary statistics
N Mean Median SD 5 25 75 95
Dividends per share 391,865 0.245 0.195 0.214 0.038 0.100 0.326 0.625
Change in dividends per share 327,816 0.003 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030
Constant dividend streak 383,809 6.670 4 8.264 1 2 8 23
Three-day announcement return 327,026 0.002 0.000 0.040 −0.053 −0.017 0.019 0.063
The sample includes all records from the CRSP event file with a distribution code (DISTCD) of 1232 (ordinary
taxable cash dividends, paid quarterly) with a share code (SHRCD) of 10 or 11 (ordinary common shares,
excluding companies incorporated outside the United States, Americus Trust Components, closed-end funds,
and REITs) and non-missing data on dividends per share and the declaration date. Change in dividends per share
is computed only over three-month windows (with an allowance for the fact that gaps between dividend payments
are frequently two or four calendar months) with no stock splits. Constant dividend streak is the number of past
periods where dividends per share remained unchanged. Three-day announcement return is computed as the sum
in the three days surrounding the dividend declaration date of the difference between the total return and the
CRSP value-weighted stock index return.
3.6 Asymmetric announcement returns
Even if executives disavow standard signaling models, shareholders clearly
care about dividends—particularly cuts. That dividend cuts would be received
especially poorly is a prediction of the model, but not of standard signaling
models. The main effect is that cutting a dividend, even slightly, is fully
revealing and betrays the firm as one that cannot afford even the reference
dividend.
Aharony and Swary (1980) examine cases in which dividend announcements
occur separately from earnings announcements. The average cumulative
abnormal return in a 21-day window surrounding a dividend decrease was
on the order of five percentage points. The average cumulative abnormal
return surrounding a dividend increase was closer to one percentage point.
Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969), Charest (1978), Eades, Hess, and Kim
(1985), Lang and Litzenberger (1989), and Yoon and Starks (1995) find similar
conclusions. These results are consistent with an asymmetric announcement
effect as predicted by the model.7
In our sample, a dividend declaration is met with a 20-basis-point abnormal
return in our sample, as reported in Table 1. The median abnormal return is zero.
This is a sample of firms that did not omit a dividend, so a slightly positive
average is not surprising. More importantly, Figure 5 shows the market reaction
to changes in dividends per share. We split the sample into increments of $0.05
in Panel A or $0.025 in Panel B around zero change. We round down to the
nearest threshold, so that a dividend increase of $0.01 is included in the zero
dividend change group, and a dividend cut of $0.01 is included in the $0.025
cut group. Next, we compute the median three-day abnormal return for each
group. The pattern in both panels is similar. Dividend cuts are greeted with
7 Many of these papers simply follow “dividend increases” and “dividend decreases.” The extent to which such
an exercise can actually document an asymmetry is ambiguous, given that the average decrease is larger than
the average increase, at least in dividend per share (DPS) terms. Our specifications involve following “big” and
“small” changes in DPS as well.
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Panel A. Changes in dividends per share grouped to the nearest 0.05  
Panel B. Changes in dividends per share grouped to the nearest 0.025  
Figure 5
Market reaction to changes in quarterly dividends per share
Average three-day abnormal return by change in quarterly dividends per share. Panel A groups changes in
dividends per share into groups of 0.05, while Panel B groups changes in dividends per share into groups of
0.025. The groups are formed by rounding the changes in dividends per share down to the nearest threshold.
Three-day abnormal returns are computed as the sum in the three days surrounding the dividend declaration date
of the difference between the total return and the CRSP value-weighted stock index return. The sample from
Table 1 is further limited to changes over a three-month window with no stock splits.
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Table 2
Market reaction to changes in quarterly dividends per share
1 2 3
[T-statistic] [T-statistic]
Coefficient [T-statistic] Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
b 10.95 [22.38]
b−∞,−0.2 −4.83 [−3.27] −4.83 [−3.28]
b−0.2,−0.1 −0.93 [−0.21] −0.79 [−0.18]
b−0.1,−0.05 11.03 [1.28] 8.96 [1.12]
b−0.05,−0.025 52.13 [2.40]
b−0.025,0 75.77 [4.66]
b−0.05,0 65.93 [11.93]
b0,0.05 27.96 [39.80]
b0,0.025 35.78 [26.73]
b0.025,0.05 12.77 [5.63]
b0.05,0.1 5.41 [2.46] 0.81 [0.38]
b0.1,0.2 −4.43 [−2.02] −3.94 [−1.79]
b0.2,∞ −0.09 [−0.09] −0.12 [−0.12]
N 327,026 327,026 327,026
R2 0.0066 0.0136 0.0135
b−0.1,0–b0,0.1 84.97 (0.000) 46.12 (0.000)
Piecewise linear regressions of average three-day abnormal return on change in quarterly dividends per share.
Three-day abnormal returns are computed as the sum in the three days surrounding the dividend declaration date
of the difference between the total return and the CRSP value-weighted stock index return. The sample from
Table 1 is further limited to changes over a three-month window with no stock splits. Heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors are reported in brackets.
a larger negative return than dividend increases of the same magnitude. The
difference is roughly a factor of two. In fact, the whole response curve is quite
similar to the pattern predicted by the model in Panel D of Figures 1 and 2.8
We examine the patterns in Figure 5 econometrically in Table 2, where we
estimate piecewise linear regressions of the market reaction on the change in
dividends per share. We are particularly interested in the shift in slope just
below and above zero. The first regression is a simple linear regression. Each
$0.01 change in dividends leads to an 11-basis-point reaction. We use robust
standard errors in all tests to control for the possibility that, for example, there
may be positive correlation among high-beta stocks announcing in the same
period.
This obscures a highly nonlinear relationship where changes around zero
are much more important than larger movements. The second, piecewise linear
regression shows that small cuts in dividends up to $0.025 are greeted with a
market reaction of 76 basis points for each $0.01 change. Small increases in
dividends up to $0.025 are greeted with a market reaction of 36 basis points, or
approximately half the slope that we observe in cuts. There are similarly large
differences in the next increments, though the reaction per $0.01 of dividend
change drops off quickly. As a summary test, we compare the sum of the three
8 The apparent concavity is not a prediction of our simple model. We focus instead on the effects in the neighborhood
of zero. It is worth noting that larger changes in dividends are comparatively rare and may reflect a set of
circumstances that are outside of the model, where firms make larger adjustments in regular dividends. They
may also reflect firms that simply have higher share prices, and so a $0.10 change in dividends per share is not
as newsworthy, inducing a downward bias as we increase dollar dividend changes.
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coefficients between –$0.10 and zero to those between zero and +$0.10. The
slope for dividend cuts is larger both economically and statistically. We repeat
the analysis with a coarser estimation of slopes, combining the slope between
cuts or increases of less than $0.025 with those that are between $0.025 and
$0.05, with similar conclusions. Finally, in unreported results, we have limited
the sample to firm-quarters of actual dividend changes—that is, excluding zero
changes. The asymmetries are at least as strong in this case, demonstrating
that the misclassification of firms on an annual decision cycle does not affect
inferences.
An interesting question is: why focus on dividends per share (DPS) changes
as opposed to more “economically relevant” dividend measures? (We noted
above that most papers in the announcement effects literature simply analyze
“dividend increases” and “dividend decreases,” which are one step less
informative than our tests.) One reason is simply that this is how managers
and investors think about dividend policy, and to be empirically accurate it
helps to be behaviorally accurate. Brav et al. (2005) find that managers most
commonly think in DPS terms, less commonly in payout ratio or growth terms,
and almost never in dividend yield terms. The prevalence of round numbers in
DPS—and exhibit clustering in DPS terms—confirms this.
It is still useful to explore the limits of our specification. We have examined
restricting the sample to firms in the share price range of $10 and $50, hence
cutting off the extreme price deciles. In combination with our winsorization of
DPS at $2, this also keeps yields within at least a loose economic bound. After
this restriction, the point estimate of the size of the asymmetry diminishes, but
the F -test remains highly significant. The asymmetry results remain strong if
we include changes in yield, dividend growth, or a dummy variable for a cut.
These exercises control for more traditional measures of dividend change and
allow the tests to focus on DPS, the most plausible reference point unit.9
3.7 Asymmetric announcement volume
In Table 3, we extend the announcement returns analysis by replacing it
with abnormal volume as the dependent variable. This offers some additional
evidence that dividend cuts get extra attention—the stronger market reaction
comes with somewhat stronger volume. Both increases and decreases are
associated with higher than normal volume. The negative coefficients below
zero and the positive ones above zero in the piecewise linear regressions suggest
a V-shaped pattern around zero dividend change. The coefficients are slightly
9 There are some practical issues with measures other than raw DPS as well. Small dividend cuts are rare—
firms with stock prices of $100 do not miss their dividend by $0.01, limiting our flexibility in scaling “small”
dividend cuts and our power to empirically distinguish a small and a big yield change. Dividend growth, the
most theoretically satisfying definition of a change in terms of a straightforward connection to returns via the
Gordon growth model, has other empirical problems—for example, it is easy to get growth rates of 500% in
moving from an economically tiny dividend to a small one. Changes in payout ratios become noisy as earnings
dip to near zero or become negative.
723
The Review of Financial Studies / v 29 n 3 2016
Table 3
Market reaction to changes in quarterly dividends per share: Abnormal volume
1 2 3
[T-statistic] [T-statistic]
Coefficient [T-statistic] Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
b 29.73 [5.45]
b−∞,−0.2 95.84 [4.93] 95.88 [4.93]
b−0.2,−0.1 77.50 [1.52] 76.86 [1.51]
b−0.1,−0.05 −374.41 [−3.58] −365.25 [−3.74]
b−0.05,−0.025 −576.20 [−1.94]
b−0.025,0 −686.12 [−2.94]
b−0.05,0 −637.73 [−9.46]
b0,0.05 522.41 [33.72]
b0,0.025 605.63 [20.10]
b0.025,0.05 360.93 [7.18]
b0.05,0.1 79.66 [1.89] 30.74 [0.77]
b0.1,0.2 −63.96 [−1.55] −58.70 [−1.43]
b0.2,∞ −7.90 [−0.50] −8.19 [−0.52]
N 288,740 288,740 288,740
R2 0.0001 0.0069 0.0069
b−0.1,0–b0,0.1 590.51 (0.000) 449.84 (0.000)
Piecewise linear regressions of average three-day abnormal volume on change in quarterly dividends per share.
Three-day abnormal volume is computed as the log difference between the average daily volume in the three
days surrounding the dividend declaration date and the average daily volume in the 90 calendar days preceding
the announcement. The sample from Table 1 is further limited to changes over a three-month window with no
stock splits. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
larger in absolute value for cuts than increases, however. In the range from
zero to a cut of $0.025, every $0.01 cut in dividends is associated with an
increase in volume of 686 basis points, or almost 7% more than normal volume.
Similar dividend increases are also associated with higher volume, but the
rate is somewhat smaller at 606 basis points. The difference is not large in
economic terms, compared with the difference in returns, but the joint test of
the differential sensitivity of volume to dividend changes above and below
zero is statistically strong. Also, Figure 4 showed that dividend decreases are
larger, on average, bringing the total increase in volume to a more economically
significant level.
4. New Evidence
In addition to explaining known stylized facts at least as well as standard
signaling models, whether taken individually or collectively, the behavioral
signaling approach suggests a testable comparative static. The core idea is that
the power of dividends as a signal is proportional to their use as reference
points—in the model, this is parameter b. Splitting the sample on b should
illustrate cross-sectional differences in announcement effect asymmetries, the
degree of clustering, and so on.
How to measure the intensity of a dividend reference point for any given
firm-quarter? Several proxies come to mind, including firm size, number of
analysts, or retail ownership, for example. These proxies, unfortunately, invite
type II error, because they pick up both b and, simultaneously, information
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Figure 6
Clustering following quarterly dividend-per-share streaks
The number of observations and the clustering percentage for streaks of up to four years. We divide the sample
of dividend announcements into those where the dividend changed from the previous period, a streak of 0, where
the dividend remained the same after being changed the previous period, a streak of 1, and so on. The clustering
percentage at a streak of 1 is the percentage of firms that do not change their dividend after having changed their
dividend in the previous period. The clustering percentage at a streak of 2 is the percentage of firms that do not
change their dividend after having maintained their dividend at the same level for the previous two periods. And
so on.
asymmetry. Consider a high-analyst firm, for example. It will indeed attract
more attention and scrutiny of dividends. However, this also means that firms
with these characteristics have less to signal in the first place. There is less
information asymmetry over ε1 precisely because of the attention. We could at
best determine whether the reference point effect dominates the need to signal,
not whether the reference point effect exists. A proxy for b thus needs to be
chosen carefully.
4.1 A direct test: Dividend streaks
Our proxy for b involves dividend streaks. If memory is an important part
of reference point formation, then repeated dividends of the same amount
would presumably be stronger reference points. The basic idea is that long
streaks constitute stronger reference points, so there should be more clustering
and the patterns in announcement effects should be more pronounced as the
streak lengthens. Importantly, the repetition of a given dividend does not have
any obvious correlation with investor attention or a fundamental degree of
uncertainty.
We plot clustering around successive streaks in Figure 6, examining streaks
of length 1 through 16 separately. A large number of firms reevaluate their
dividend policy annually, so there is a drop in clustering after a streak of 4, 8, 12,
and 16. Controlling for this seasonality shows a strict monotonicity, however;
an increase is apparent in any year-over-year comparison—for example, in
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Figure 7
Market reaction following quarterly dividend-per-share streaks
Average three-day abnormal return by change in quarterly dividends per share. Changes in dividends per share
are sorted into groups of 0.05, by rounding the raw dividend per share down to the nearest threshold. We partition
the sample into situations where the dividend was changed in the previous period (no streak), where the dividend
was not changed in the previous period, but it was changed within the last four periods (streak4), and where
the dividend was not changed in the previous four periods (streak >4). Three-day abnormal returns are computed
as the sum in the three days surrounding the dividend declaration date of the difference between the total return
and the CRSP value-weighted stock index return. The sample from Table 1 is further limited to changes over a
three-month window with no stock splits.
the continuance probabilities of 2, 6, 10, and 14 quarters, or of 3, 7, 11, and
15 quarters. Long streaks are also likelier to continue. After a streak lasting
a few years, the probability of continuing from the past quarter nears 90%.
These patterns are consistent with the prediction that clustering becomes more
pronounced as the reference point strengthens.
We next consider the market reaction. We partition the sample into three
categories: decisions following a change in the prior quarter; decisions
following no change for up to four quarters, to negate the periodicity apparent
in reviews of dividend policy; and dividend decisions following no change for
more than four quarters. The results are in Figure 7 and Table 4. The results are
as predicted. The no-streak sample has essentially no difference between the
effect of a decrease and increase around zero, while the patterns are stronger
as the streaks get longer.
For example, in the long-streak sample, the market reaction to dividend cuts
is stronger than gains, and also stronger than the unconditional coefficients
in Table 2 at 106 basis points per $0.01 change in dividends just below zero,
versus 76 basis points in Table 2. The market reaction to a dividend increase
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Table 4
Market reaction following quarterly dividend-per-share streaks
No streak Streak 4 Streak >4
[Diff. [Diff.
Coefficient [T-statistic] Coefficient T-statistic] Coefficient T-statistic]
b−∞,−0.2 −7.81 [−4.40] −3.82 [1.79] −1.68 [3.40]
b−0.2,−0.1 18.32 [2.26] −0.32 [−1.90] −7.22 [−3.14]
b−0.1,−0.05 −1.62 [−0.08] 24.03 [0.97] 1.27 [0.12]
b−0.05,−0.025 4.03 [0.09] 9.45 [0.10] 73.21 [1.24]
b−0.025,0 31.96 [1.22] 79.37 [1.29] 106.15 [1.86]
b0,0.025 44.15 [8.51] 29.48 [−2.70] 54.03 [1.65]
b0.025,0.05 12.43 [1.32] 15.25 [0.29] 2.30 [−0.97]
b0.05,0.1 3.33 [0.31] 11.29 [0.71] −5.73 [−0.79]
b0.1,0.2 −4.09 [−0.51] −5.61 [−0.18] −1.94 [0.25]
b0.2,∞ 0.72 [0.31] −1.86 [−1.00] 1.41 [0.23]
N 327,026
R2 0.0147
b−0.1,0–b0,0.1 −25.54 (0.206)
b−0.1,0–b0,0.1
No streak b−0.1,0–b0,0.1 87.90 (0.002) 161.09 (0.000)
Average three-day abnormal return by change in quarterly dividends per share. We partition the sample into
situations where the dividend was changed in the previous period (no streak), where the dividend was not
changed in the previous period, but it was changed within the last four periods (streak  4), and where the
dividend was not changed in the previous four periods (streak > 4). T −statistics and p-values are on differences
from the no-streak sample. Three-day abnormal returns are computed as the sum in the three days surrounding
the dividend declaration date of the difference between the total return and the CRSP value-weighted stock index
return. The sample from Table 1 is further limited to changes over a three-month window with no stock splits.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
is also larger at 54 versus 36 basis points in Table 2, despite being half of the
reaction to a dividend cut in Table 4. These results support the prediction that
stronger reference points generate stronger market reactions to changes.10
4.2 A placebo test: ADRs
The dividends streaks test is our main new test of the model. We supplement
this direct test, where we find an effect where we expect it, with a placebo test,
which shows that we do not find an effect where we do not expect it.
Our placebo test involves dividends on American Depository Receipts
(ADRs). An ADR allows U.S. investors to purchase shares in a company that
is incorporated abroad and listed on a foreign exchange, but without executing
a transaction on a foreign exchange in a different currency. Because of foreign
exchange volatility, the dividend policy of a firm with a U.S. ADR is by
definition unable to create a reference point in two different currencies at once.
What this means is that the anchor of past dividends can be relevant only in one
currency, not both. As a result, we expect to see clustering in local currency
terms, but not in dollars. Moreover, we expect to see no market reaction to
a dividend “miss” in dollar terms. This might seem somewhat trivial, but it
10 Despite their strength, the effects here are diluted by our assumption that all firms evaluate their dividend quarterly.
For an “annual” firm that just changed its dividend, we place it in the second category for the next three quarters
even though it belongs more in the first category (no streak), and so on.
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reveals that investors are focused on a nominal reference point, rather than a
specific economic outcome measured in real terms.
The case of BP-Amoco shown in Figure 8 provides a fascinating
demonstration of how the reference point is set to appeal to the relevant investor
base. In December of 1998, British Petroleum acquired Amoco to form BP-
Amoco. BP was listed on the London Stock Exchange but also traded through
anADR. PanelAshows that prior to the merger,Amoco had increased dividends
by $0.025 each year for the prior four years. BP had increased dividends by
£0.0125 semiannually for the previous two years. Not surprisingly, the dollar
dividend on the ADR was hardly so regular.
The merger required some reconciliation between these two different but
equally rigid policies. The reconciliation was for BP to now fix dividend
increases in dollar terms. Moreover, for the several years following the merger,
the rate of increase in BP dividends exactly matched Amoco’s old rate of
increase, amounting to $0.025 each year. The common British policy of
semiannual payment, however, was kept. Dividend policy in the transition was
thus managed carefully so as not to upset dollar-dividend reference points that
had been created for Amoco shareholders over years, presumably since they
now owned a large fraction of BP shares.
Turning toward a large sample test, the suggestion from the BP-Amoco case
is that zero change in dollar dividends has no special significance for ADRs. We
use an ADR sample that is described in Appendix C. In other words, investors
do not care about dividend cuts per se, but about a cut from a mutually agreed-
upon reference point. Because reference points cannot hold simultaneously in
two currencies, ADR dividends can in most cases freely cross the zero-change
boundary. We find that the market reaction is similarly unremarkable in this
range.
Figure 9 shows the dividend policy of ADRs measured in both dollars and
local currency. Dividend changes in U.S. dollars are centered on zero change,
but the mass point at zero in Panel A is very far from what we saw in Table 1
for the CRSP sample. Moreover, the asymmetry between dividend cuts and
increases is barely apparent in Panel B when we eliminate zeros from the
sample. By contrast, when measured in local currency, there is a much clearer
delineation at zero. Non-zero dividend changes are comparatively rare in Panel
C, and when we exclude zero changes in Panel D, a preference for small
increases over decreases is readily apparent. It is noteworthy that these effects
are less pronounced in the parents-of-ADRs sample than in the CRSP sample of
Figure 4. Part of this is because we broadened the sample as much as possible
(after imposing various data screens), perhaps at the cost of including some
special or liquidating dividends. Part of this may be because the Datastream
data is lower quality, inducing an attenuation effect. In any event, it is plain
that dividend policy is more often decided in local currency than dollar terms.
We examine the market reaction to these changes in Table 6. The first
observation is that the relationship between dividend changes and the market
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Table 5
Summary statistics
N Mean Median SD 5 25 75 95
Panel A. U.S. ADRs
Dividends per share, split adjusted 10,634 0.438 0.210 2.504 0.018 0.080 0.471 1.354
Change in dividends per share 8,478 0.022 0.002 1.108 −0.228 −0.012 0.044 0.301
Five-day announcement return 3,574 0.006 0.000 0.060 −0.088 −0.023 0.031 0.116
Panel B. Parents
Dividends per share, split adjusted 31,828 42.307 1.199 878.1 0.0 0.2 5.5 34.0
Change in dividends per share 8,968 −5.042 0.005 1973.1 −2.1 0.0 0.2 5.0
Change in dividends per share, all 28,877 0.094 0.000 1144.0 −4.4 0.0 0.2 5.7
The sample includes all ADRs from Datastream and their matched parents with non-missing data on dividends
per share and without an apparent practice of paying different levels of annual versus interim dividends. The
sample includes all ADRs from Datastream with a trading history between 1990 and 2009 on a U.S. exchange
in U.S.$. We limit the sample to the following Datastream dividend types (DT): QTR, HYR, YR, FIN, INT.
We compute clean changes that require the consecutive dividends to be of the same type (DT). These data are
merged onto the Datastream returns data. For ADRs, we compute five-day returns surrounding announcement
dates (DECQ1, DECQ2, DECQ3, or DECQ4 from Worldscope via Datastream) where we have a clean change
in dividends per share. Returns are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We look back up to three months
to find a matching announcement date, and we use announcement dates from ADR-parent pairs to enlarge the
sample. The returns use the Datastream return index (RI) up to five weekdays surrounding the announcement
date, with no adjustment for market movements.
Table 6
Market reaction to changes in quarterly dividends per share for ADRs
1 2 3
[T-statistic] [T-statistic]
Coefficient [T-statistic] Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
b 0.21 [1.20]
b−∞,−0.2 0.32 [1.27] −0.33 [−1.27]
b−0.2,−0.1 −3.26 [−0.39] −3.53 [−0.43]
b−0.1,−0.05 −6.33 [−0.31] −3.92 [0.22]
b−0.05,−0.025 20.68 [0.62]
b−0.025,0 7.25 [0.33]
b−0.05,0 12.43 [1.12]
b0,0.05 15.01 [1.84]
b0,0.025 15.76 [0.89]
b0.025,0.05 15.30 [0.66]
b0.05,0.1 −24.39 [−1.86] −24.22 [−2.12]
b0.1,0.2 7.94 [1.44] 7.92 [1.46]
b0.2,∞ −0.00 [0.06] 0.00 [0.06]
N 3,574 3,574 3,574
R2 0.0006 0.0034 0.0033
b−0.1,0–b0,0.1 14.93 (0.54) 17.72 (0.28)
Piecewise linear regressions of average five-day announcement return on clean changes in quarterly dividends
per share. The sample is described in Panel A of Table 5. We compute five-day returns surrounding announcement
dates (DECQ1, DECQ2, DECQ3, or DECQ4 from Worldscope via Datastream) where we have a clean change
in dividends per share. We look back up to three months to find a matching announcement date, and we use
announcement dates from ADR-parent pairs. The returns are based on the Datastream return index (RI) up to
five weekdays surrounding the announcement date. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in
brackets.
reaction is everywhere less economically and statistically significant. The
R2 drops from 0.0136 to 0.0034. Moreover, there is no asymmetry in the
neighborhood of zero. The marginal reaction to small cuts is on average about
the same as the reaction to small increases. Together, these results suggest that
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neither ADR boards nor investors view past dividends—paid in dollars—as an
important reference point. Again, the corollary from this placebo test is that
changes in dividend policy are important because of an endogenously chosen
and acknowledged reference point, not because changes in this neighborhood
would otherwise have been economically important.
5. Conclusion
Standard dividend signaling theories posit that executives use dividends to
destroy some firm value and thereby signal that plenty remains. The money
burning typically takes the form of tax-inefficient distributions, forgone
profitable investment, or costly external finance. The executives who actually
set dividend policy overwhelmingly reject these ideas—yet, at the same time,
are equally adamant that “dividends are a signal” to shareholders and that
cutting them has negative consequences.
We develop what we believe to be a more realistic signaling approach. We
use loss aversion, which is widely supported in both the experimental and
empirical literatures, to create a model in which past dividends are reference
points against which future dividends are judged. The theory is consistent
with important aspects of the data—including survey evidence, patterns of
market reaction to dividend announcements, dividend smoothing, and the
Lintner partial-adjustment model—and the preference for regular dividends
over regular repurchases. We also find support for its broader intuition that
dividends are paid in ways that make them memorable and thus serve as stronger
reference points and signals.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proposition 1. Dividends are weakly monotonic in profits. The equilibrium level of dividends
d1 =d1(ε1) is a non-decreasing function of ε1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider some pure-strategy equilibrium in which a manager with
period-1 earnings x pays dividends d1 =d(x). Suppose that the equilibrium function d(x) is not
weakly increasing. Then there exists some x<y with d(x)>d(y). For this to be an equilibrium,
it must be that the y-type manager does not have an incentive to deviate to paying d(x), while
the x-type manager does not have an incentive to deviate to paying d(y). Note that both of these
deviations are feasible within the budget constraints of these two managers. These conditions can
be written:
λF (d (x),d0)+(1−λ)V0 (d (x),d0;x)λF (d (y),d0)+(1−λ)V0 (d (y),d0;x)
λF (d (y),d0)+(1−λ)V0 (d (y),d0;y)λF (d (x),d0)+(1−λ)V0 (d (x),d0;y)
Isolating the λ terms to the left side of the first equation and the right side of the second equation,
these become:
λF (d (x),d0)−λF (d (y),d0) (1−λ)V0 (d (y),d0;x)−(1−λ)V0 (d (x),d0;x)
(1−λ)V0 (d (y),d0;y)−(1−λ)V0 (d (x),d0;y)λF (d (x),d0)−λF (d (y),d0)
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Recall from above that V0 is supermodular. That is, higher-type managers have a “stronger” V0-
preference for high dividends than do lower-type managers. Because x <y and d(x)>d(y), this
implies that:
V0 (d (x),d0;y)−V0 (d (y),d0;y)V0 (d (x),d0;x)−V0 (d (y),d0;x)
Multiplying by –1 and (1−λ), this allows us to link the last two inequalities to give:
λF (d (x),d0)−λF (d (y),d0)λF (d (x),d0)−λF (d (y),d0)
Dividing by λ and adding the negative terms to each side yields:
F (d (x),d0)+F (d (y),d0)F (d (x),d0)+λF (d (y),d0)
Of course, this inequality must in fact be an equality. Working backward, this implies that each of
these inequalities must have been equalities all along. The x-type manager and y-type manager
are each indifferent between paying d(x) or d(y). This can only be sustained if the investors
(accurately) believe that the firm with the lower dividends in fact has the better earnings. This is an
unstable sunspot equilibrium, which we rule out by requiring whenever a manager is indifferent
between paying d(x) or d(y), he pays the higher of the two. This suffices to prove the proposition.
Derivation of x1. Having established the existence of a solution with the desired functional form,
we solve for x1 by imposing the equilibrium conditions on the proposed solution. The derivation
of x1 can be broken into three cases: x1 <2α, x1 =2α, and x1 >2α. The case where x1 <2α is
infeasible, as it implies x1 <
x1
2 +α, so a manager with earnings 1 =x1 is unable to pay the dividend
x1
2 +α. This case can then be ignored. In the equality case, x1 is immediately pinned down by
assumption.
In the final case with x1 >2α, we have
x1
2 +α<x1. Then a manager with earnings ε1 <x1 by
a sufficiently small amount has the ability to pay dividends d1 =
x1
2 +α, imitating the higher-type
manager. Of course, the higher-type manager has the same option of imitating the lower-type
manager. In this unconstrained case, the manager with ε1 =x1 must be indifferent between paying
the pooling level of dividends or the separating level of dividends.
The indifference condition gives:
λ
d0 +x1
2
+(1−λ)
(
1+x1 +(1−β)d0 −bβ
(
d0 − x12
)2
1
d0>
x1
2
)
=λx1 +(1−λ)(1+x1 +(1−β)
(x1
2
+α
)
−bβ
(x1
2
+α− x1
2
)2
1 x1
2 +α>
x1
2
)
This simplifies to:
λ
1−λ
d0
2
+(1−β)d0 −bβ
(
d0 − x12
)2
1
d0>
x1
2
=
λ
1−λ
x1
2
+((1−β)
(x1
2
+α
)
−bβα2)
In the case where d0 x12 , this becomes:
x1 =
λ
1−λ d0 +(1−β)2(d0 −α)+2bβα2
λ
1−λ +(1−β)
as in the text. In the remaining case where d0 >
x1
2 , the indifference condition becomes:
0=bβ(d0 − x12 )
2 +
(
λ
1−λ +1−β
)
x1
2
−((1−β)(d0 −α)+bβα2 + λ1−λ
d0
2
)
as in the body of the text.
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Proposition 4. In the equilibrium described in Proposition 3, x1 and the market reaction to
d1 <d0 are increasing in b.
Proof of Proposition 4. x1 is defined in Proposition 3 as satisfying one of the following two
equations:
bβ
(
d0 − x12
)2
+
(
1−β+ λ1−λ
)
x1
2 −
(
(1−β)(d0 −α)+bβα2 + λ1−λ d02
)
=0 when x1 <2d0, or
x1 =
λ
1−λ d0+2(1−β)(d0−α)+2bβα2
λ
1−λ +(1−β)
when x12d0.
Consider the case where x1 <2d0 and a comparative static in b. Note first that ∂α∂b =− αb . Then:
∂x1
∂b
2bβ
(
d0 − x12
)
+β
(
d0 − x12
)2
+
(
1−β+ λ
1−λ
)
1
2
∂x1
∂b
−(1−β)α
b
−βα2 +2bβ α
b
=0
Rearranging:
∂x1
∂b
(
2bβ
(
d0 − x12
)
+
1
2
(
1−β+ λ
1−λ
))
=βα2 −2βα+(1−β) α
b
−β
(
d0 − x12
)2
In the case where x1 <2d0 the coefficient on
∂x1
∂b
on the left is positive. The right-hand side is
positive if and only if:
β
(
d0 − x12
)2
 α
b
(bβα−2bβ+(1−β))
Solving this out completely is difficult, but we can state necessary conditions by requiring that the
right-hand side of this inequality be positive. As α, b are each positive, this condition becomes:
0bβ (α−2)+1−β
By choice of λ, α may be made arbitrarily large, so this can be satisfied.
In the simpler case where x12d0, the comparative static is:
∂x1
∂b
=
2(1−β)( α
b
)
+2βα2 +4βα
λ
1−λ +(1−β)
=
2α
λ
1−λ +(1−β)
(
(1−β)b−1 +βα+2β
)
which is positive, as desired.
Appendix B. U.S. Dividends and Returns Data
The primary sample of U.S. dividends data in Table 1 is from the Center for Research on Security
Prices (CRSP) database. We start with all records in the event database with a distribution code
(CRSP: DISTCD) equal to 1232. These are ordinary taxable dividends paid at a quarterly frequency.
We further limit the sample to firms with a share code (CRSP: SHRCD) of 10 or 11. This restricts
our attention to ordinary common shares and eliminates most companies incorporated outside
the United States, Americus Trust Components, closed-end funds, and REITs. Such firms have
dividend policies that may have reference points denominated in non-dollar currencies or have
regulatory or contractual restrictions on dividend policy. We further eliminate dividend payments
of $0, dividend payments greater than $2 per share (these are rare, and we wish to avoid skewing
computations of nominal changes), and dividends for which there is no declaration date (CRSP:
DCLRDT). The CRSP data start in 1926, but restricting attention to more recent periods does not
change economic or statistical conclusions.
Note that by eliminating $0 dividend payments, we eliminate dividend omissions and initiations.
Initiations are somewhat removed from deviating from a pool of similar firms. Omissions can
734
Dividends as Reference Points: A Behavioral Signaling Approach
be driven by qualitatively different considerations, and we want to avoid any asymmetry in
announcement effects to be driven simply by omissions.
Our stock returns and volume data are also from CRSP. To measure the reaction to a dividend
announcement, we compute a three-day abnormal stock return around the declaration date. This
is the simple return (CRSP: RET) for the firm in the day before, the day of, and the day after a
dividend declaration minus the return of the CRSP value-weighted index over the same window.
We also measure volume from the dividend declaration through three days after. We normalize this
volume by taking the log difference between the average daily declaration date volume and the
average daily volume in the previous 90 calendar days.
Appendix C. ADR and Parents Dividends and Returns Data
TheADRs and matched parents described in Table 5 are from Datastream and cover the period from
1990 through 2009. We restrict the sample to firms with an ADR traded on the NYSE, the Nasdaq,
and other U.S. over-the-counter exchanges. This gives us a preliminary list of 4,916 Datastream
codes for ADRs and their parents. Despite this large initial number of potential firms, the coverage
and quality of Datastream dividend data is much lower than CRSP. Some of the parents appear
more than once, meaning that there is more than one ADR for a given parent firm. We treat these
as separate observations.
We gather information on dividends paid per share (Datastream: DD) in each month for these
Datastream codes. We restrict attention to the following dividend types (Datastream: DT): QTR,
HYR, YR, FIN, INT. Semiannual and annual dividends are more common abroad, so we include
them. We also include dividends designated as final and intermediate under the assumption that
many of these are regular dividends during the course of a fiscal year. We exclude a small number
of observations where an ADR pays a dividend in a foreign currency, despite apparently trading on
a U.S. exchange, or the parent pays a dividend in U.S. dollars. These are likely data errors. We are
able to find 19,046 dividends for ADRs and 32,177 dividends for their parents. Given the smaller
quantity of data, we use split-adjusted values, so we can examine changes in more cases.
Our interest is whether or not a reference point is created through the payment ofADR dividends.
When we compute changes, we require that the dividend type be constant from one period to the
next. Quarterly dividends are reported to be more common in the ADRs in Datastream than in
their matched parents, for reasons that are not clear, so we lose more data when we look for clean
changes in the parent sample. The dividend type typically stays the same in consecutive records
for ADRs, while the dividend type is the same in only 9,196 of 29,211 consecutive parent records.
The dividends per share for the parents are paid in a wide range of currencies, so the levels
of dividends per share range widely. There are many small dividend payments in more valuable
currencies and many large ones in less valuable currencies. There is no unambiguous way to put
all of these currencies on level terms without losing the essence of a reference point analysis, so
we leave them in raw terms.
We compute announcement returns for the ADR sample by merging declaration dates from
Worldscope (Datastream: DECQ1–DECQ4) to Datastream return indexes (Datastream: RI) for
the five-day window surrounding the declaration date to accommodate the lower quality of
Worldscope’s declaration dates. Dividend payments are matched to declaration dates that occur for
up to three previous months to increase coverage.
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